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BRITTA VAN BEERS1 
 
Do we own our bodies as legal property? Or, are our bodies rather part of who we are 
as a juristic person, capable of invoking legal rights and remedies under a legal 
system? To illustrate the complexities of this legal-philosophical puzzle, French legal 
historian Jean-Pierre Baud uses the following case of “jurisprudence-fiction”, a term 
he coined himself in his classic 1993 work L’affaire de la main volée. Une histoire 
juridique du corps.2 Imagine your hand is cut off in a freak accident. During the 
accident, your worst enemy happens to be present. He manages to get hold of your 
severed hand and throws it into the central heating boiler. It is clear that you have 
been seriously wronged. But how can the actions of your enemy be qualified under 
criminal law?  
 
A first possibility is assault and/or battery. Without your enemy’s intervention, it 
might have been possible surgically to reattach your hand. Therefore, by taking away 
your hand, your enemy has in fact removed the possibility of recovery and 
condemned you to a lifelong mutilation. However, a conviction for battery would be 
problematic in this case. After all, it was not your enemy that cut off your hand; he 
only made it disappear.  
 
Would conviction for theft then be a better option? Your enemy has taken something 
away that rightfully belongs to you. Moreover, he has taken something so intimate, 
that one could even argue that it is part of who you are. Yet this legal solution is 
questionable too. It presupposes that you were the rightful owner of your hand before 
it was cut off. However, in most legal systems ownership of your own body parts is 
denied. The underlying thought is that exactly because your body is part of who you 
are, you cannot also own it. It is either être or avoir. More importantly, the fear is that 
once legal property in the body is accepted, human dignity may be compromised, and 
new forms of exploitation can be expected.   
 
All in all, the existing legal system would leave the fictional judge no other option 
than acquittal. This shows, according to Baud, how the legal system has until recently 
protected the human body only indirectly, without truly ‘seeing’ the body in itself.3  
 
Exotic as Baud’s example may be, developments in medicine and biotechnology have 
made the question of ownership and property in the human body more pressing than 
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ever. Almost 20 years after the  publication of Baud’s book, the legal situation 
remains as opaque as ever, even though the possibilities to transplant, isolate, 
conserve and transfer human body parts, tissues, gametes and genetic sequences have 
grown spectacularly. In fact, even hand transplants, such as in Baud’s imaginary 
stolen hand case, have become a medical reality.4  
 
The need for a coherent and effective legal approach is acute. Whatever direction 
policy makers may choose for biomedical regulation, these guidelines will have to be 
framed in legal language. The question is whether the existing legal framework can 
provide the tools and vocabulary for a fruitful approach to these issues. It is exactly 
towards this goal that legal scholar Nils Hoppe has devoted his book Bioequity – 
Property and the Human Body. To understand the goal, and the value of this book, a 
brief look at the current legal framework may be helpful.  
 
What makes qualification of the human body within the current legal framework so 
difficult is a deeply rooted dualism that characterises both common and civil law 
systems: the summa divisio between persons and things, or between personal rights 
(such as the right to vote or human dignity) and property rights. As one both is and 
has one’s body, the human body seems to escape these foundational categories. 
However, since the legal system does not allow for any other options, lawyers are 
forced to choose either side of the dichotomy. Traditionally, most legal systems have 
opted to classify the human body as part of the legal person rather than as the object 
of property rights. A very basic example is that a physical injury is not qualified as 
property damage but as a personal injury.  
 
The underlying philosophy seems to be that qualification as part of the person can 
guarantee a certain inalienability of the human body as well as its special legal status 
among tangible objects. To place the body outside the realm of objects and property 
entitlement, is generally considered a good protection mechanism against the possible 
dangers of instrumentalisation and exploitation of persons and their bodies. 
 
Yet this ‘personalist’ position seems to have become less convincing in an era in 
which possibilities to alienate parts and elements of the human body abound. Person 
and body are less interconnected than ever. Moreover, these novel biomedical 
practices and contexts require regulation of the human body in its most tangible 
aspects, such as guidelines for the conservation, use and transfer of human tissues and 
gametes. To a certain extent, the personalist approach can be helpful in this context 
too. Its influence is especially clear in the prevailing gift approach to the human body. 
As an expression of the interconnectedness between person and body and the body’s 
special status, the transfer of human biological materials is to take place according to 
the rules of the gift, and not the rules of the market. This so called principle of non-
commercialisation, which is recognised in most legal systems, allows individuals to 
only donate their biological materials.  
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However, one can wonder, as Hoppe does, if this approach offers real and adequate 
answers to all of the legal questions that are raised by biomedical practice. The 
overarching argument of Hoppe’s book is that traditional legal approaches to the 
human body, in which property rights in one’s own body are denied, have not resulted 
in sufficient protection of the individual against exploitation, but have, on the 
contrary, actually given rise to it. Moreover, property interests in the body have been 
rejected for the wrong reasons, Hoppe argues, mixing legal reasoning with emotions 
and ethics, and not differentiating between different sorts of tissue retention. Instead, 
to do justice to the complexities of biomedical reality and the novel ways in which 
human tissues are put to use, he argues for a reinvention of the concept of property 
though the law of equity, thereby giving rise to the intriguing concept of bioequity. 
 
Hoppe’s main criticism corresponds with Baud’s objections against traditional legal 
approaches to the human body. The law’s blind spot to excised body parts and tissues 
has left the individual unprotected against unauthorised use and exploitation of these 
materials by third parties. In fact, the case of the stolen hand shows many similarities 
with the causa belli of most advocates of a property approach to the human body: the 
well-known John Moore case.  
 
Moore, an American patient being treated for a rare form of leukaemia, found out that 
huge profits were being made from the cell line that had been developed without his 
knowledge from his biological materials. Just as there were no criminal sanctions 
available to punish the thief of the severed hand, Moore could not claim conversion of 
‘his’ biological materials, according to the California Supreme Court. This outcome 
points to a widely criticised paradox that is inherent to the double logic of the current 
system: one cannot have property in one’s own body, since this could possibly lead to 
the objectification and exploitation of individuals. Yet after separation, human tissues, 
as if by miracle, suddenly become available for appropriation. However, the ensuing 
property rights in these tissues are not automatically granted to the source of the 
materials, but to the person who appropriated the materials. What’s more, these third 
parties can exploit them commercially, since the principle of non-commercialisation 
does not apply to further use of donated biological materials. This means that the 
source is usually excluded from any profits made of his tissues. 
 
This criticism is well known and has been voiced many times. The originality of the 
book lies in the alternative concept of property that Hoppe proposes, and the questions 
that the book raises about the methodology to follow when developing such 
constructions. To start with the last point, a central point of criticism in Hoppe’s book 
is what he calls the “obfuscation of terminology and belief” (p. 9). According to him 
the discussion is too often influenced by emotional charges, philosophical 
presuppositions and ethical viewpoints. Instead, a clear terminology and systematic 
framework should precede any analysis in this legal field. It is for this reason that 
Hoppe offers the reader in part I of his book an elaborate matrix of different sorts of 
tissue retention. As there is indeed a tendency in debates on the commodification of 
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the human body to neglect essential differences between different types of tissue and 
procurement, this matrix is one of the most relevant and interesting parts of the book. 
According to Hoppe, a thorough analysis of the problem should at least take the 
following factors into account: the nature of the source; the type of consent; the 
impact of the medical intervention; the motive for the excision; the type of tissue; the 
question whether the appropriation was honest or dishonest; and lastly the pecuniarity. 
His matrix not only provides the reader with a tool to analyse these complex debates, 
but could also be helpful to policy makers when developing regulatory regimes for the 
‘tissue economies’5 that have come into existence with the rise of biomedical 
technologies. 
  
In the second part of his book, Hoppe uses this framework for an analysis and critical 
evaluation of the legal approaches that have so far been developed in response to this 
issue. Hoppe limits his analysis to the common law position. Although his account 
offers an interesting overview of the most important legislation and case law in this 
field, what really keeps one continuing to read is Hoppe’s early promise to develop a 
new “kind of property to capture the rights and entitlements attached to the human 
body and its parts” (p. 10). After his outspoken criticism on existing legal approaches 
to the human body in part II, one is desperate to know which alternative legal 
constructions he himself has to offer. 
 
Hoppe does not come to this synthesis until the third and last part of the book, also 
entitled ‘Bioequity’. Here Hoppe claims that a new and adequate approach to the 
human body can be derived from the law of equity. When no appropriate remedies are 
available within common law, equity can function as a correction mechanism to 
provide the John Moores of this world with an equitable entitlement to their biological 
material. This entitlement cannot be equated with a conventional property right, but 
constitutes in Hoppe’s words “a new property class for human material” - which 
makes one wonder about the exact nature, scope and basis of this equitable 
entitlement. Unfortunately, at this crucial point of the book the author leaves the 
reader practically empty-handed, as he only devotes four pages to his centerpiece 
concept. Even though Hoppe claims that equity can be used to establish a new 
property class for human material, the application of bioequity to his test case (John 
Moore) furthers the impression that equity is used here more or less as a synonym for 
justice and fairness.  
 
Furthermore, in the end, the different parts of the analysis are not tied together. For 
instance, it seems a missed opportunity that Hoppe does not fall back on his analytical 
matrix to suggest an alternative class of property. More specifically, because of the 
vagueness of his concept of bioequity, one is left with the impression that the different 
types of tissue retention are thrown together in a big legal heap after all. However, the 
concept of bioequity is innovative, and could after further elaboration offer an 
important contribution to future debates on this growing problem. 
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A last point of criticism concerns Hoppe’s normative presuppositions. As was 
mentioned before, in the first part of his book Hoppe expresses his concern about the 
tendency to mingle legal arguments with ethics and emotions. To my relief, this 
concern has not prevented him from producing a passionately written and outspoken 
work of legal scholarship. However, Hoppe does not seem to have completely been 
able to rid himself of certain moral assumptions. As a reader one gets the impression 
that some important dimensions of the legal debate on property in the human body 
were neglected or disqualified beforehand. For instance, it does not become clear why 
exactly it would be unacceptable to apply traditional property approaches to the 
human body. Perhaps this is a consequence of Hoppe’s rejection of terms such as 
‘exploitation’ and ‘commodification’, which he disqualifies from the debate as too 
“negatively connotated” (p. 5-6). It is in this vein that he also writes the following: 
“Whilst there is sufficient empirical evidence that the human body is valuable, its 
sacred status or even ‘pricelessness’ are products of subjective or religious views.” (p. 
6) Later on, Hoppe jeers at Kantian-inspired refusals to perceive the human body as 
one’s property (p. 75-77).  
 
The disqualification of these ‘negative’ terms and viewpoints from the legal 
discussion seems unnecessary and even undesirable. Although it would be wrong to 
project one’s own ethical beliefs onto an analysis of the legal debate, it also seems a 
distortion of legal reality to neglect completely certain ethical dimensions of the 
existing legal framework. For example, without reference to Kantian approaches, in 
which the pricelessness of the human body dominates, it seems almost impossible to 
explain why the human body has a special status among all objects of law.  
 
Furthermore, this is exactly what makes these matters so complicated. Both a purely 
libertarian, property oriented approach and a purely conservative, Kantian or Christian 
inspired personalist approach seem too simplistic. As Hoppe himself writes: “A 
marriage of the two views [...] appears eminently persuasive.” (p. 8-9) The human 
body forces one to look beyond the existing dichotomy. Unfortunately, Hoppe is not 
completely successful in removing the impression that his own ethical orientation is 
towards the libertarian philosophy. If this is true, an explication of his own ethical 
position would have been desirable. More importantly, in that case Hoppe has not 
been able to truly go beyond the dualism of the current debates. Nonetheless, 
Bioequity is a well-written criticism of traditional approaches to the human body, and 
contains some sharp observations on existing regulatory regimes. The analytical 
matrix from part I, especially, could be of enormous value for both researchers and 
policy makers in this complex field. 
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